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Louisiana Homestead Tax Exemption
- An Unlitigated Constitutional
Provision
CHARLES A. REYNARD*
There is nothing startling in the observation that amend-
ments to the Louisiana Constitution are frequently no sooner
adopted than their application, interpretation or substantive
validity are subjected to the judicial process by ever willing
litigants. This is particularly true when they embody some
provision concerning taxation or other fiscal matters. More
remarkable, however, is the fact that one such provision has
been a part of our organic law for over fifteen years without
having been subjected to the rigors of litigation in a single re-
ported case. It is the purpose of this article to trace the develop-
ment of the law of the homestead tax exemption from such
sources as are available in the absence of case authority.
Louisiana first made provision for tax exemption of the
homestead in 1934 by amending Article X, Section 4, of her State
Constitution. By so doing, she was following the lead of Texas
which had adopted a similar measure in 1932 and became one of
fourteen states which have ultimately come to participate in
this type of tax program. Originating, as it did, during a period
of economic depression, one of the essential purposes of the
plan was to protect the small farm or home owner from for-
feiture of his holdings in tax delinquency proceedings. Gradual
and substantial improving economic conditions have long since
relegated such an objective to secondary importance and the
continued retention of the exemption must find its justification
if at all in other considerations of governmental fiscal policy.
It is said that such justification is to be found in the incentive
or inducement to home ownership which the exemption creates. 2
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. Commerce Clearing House, Tax Systems (11 ed. 1948).
2. See Owen, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Louisiana (1947)
8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 41-47.
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exemption. It is sufficient to say that fiscal planners and admin-
istrators differ widely in their views on the issue.3
One or two other general observations remain to be made.
Louisiana's homestead exemption differs materially from simi-
lar provisions in the other states that have adopted such laws.
In all other such states the exemption extends to state taxes;
in three of them4 the exemption applies to all taxes, state,
local, special district and municipal. Louisiana alone has hit
upon a middle ground in extending the exemption to taxes
imposed by the states, the parishes, and special districts but not
to municipal taxes-except in the City of New Orleans. This
exception seems quite properly to have been subjected to criti-
cism by Professor Owen, who has observed: "There seems no
valid reason, however, why home ownership should be encour-
aged in New Orleans and discouraged in Shreveport and Baton
Rouge."5
A second respect in which the Louisiana treatment of home-
stead exemption differs radically from that of other jurisdictions
is that involving the reimbursement to the taxing agencies
for losses suffered by reason of the exemption-this recoupment
being achieved through the device of the State Property Tax
Relief Fund. Created by Act 54 of 1934,6 simultaneously with
the exemption itself, this fund, constituted from revenues de-
rived from the state income tax, the alcoholic beverage tax and
the public utilities tax, is disbursed on the order of the state
treasurer to the various agencies and funds whose revenues are
diminished by the operation of the homestead tax exemption.
No other state granting a similar exemption makes any such
provision for reimbursement.
Turning, now, to the particular provisions of the exemption
-it was first adopted, as previously indicated, in 1934 and has
since that time been amended five times: First, in 1936 to pro-
vide that it be extended to the surviving spouse or minor chil-
dren of a decedent; Second, in 1942, to make it applicable to two
or more tracts of land; Third, also in 1942, to confer power on the
legislature to authorize municipalities to provide for homestead
exemption from municipal taxation; Fourth, in 1946, to increase
3. Ibid.
4. Florida, Oklahoma and Wyoming.5. Owen, supra note 2.
6. The act has been frequently amended. In its present form it exists
as La. Act 134 of 1948. Intervening amendatory acts are La. Acts 11 of 1940
(E.S.), 122 of 1940, and 64 of 1944.
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the amount of the exemption from $2,000 to $5,000-for a period
of five years ending in 1951 where the claimant is a veteran of
World War II; and Fifth, and finally, in 1948, when the increased
exemption for veterans, just mentioned, was modified to make
the five year exemption available for any period of five years-
not to be extended beyond 1954.
In its present form the constitutional provision (for the
non-veteran homesteader) 7 reads as follows:
Article X, Section 4: "The following property and no other
shall be exempt from taxation:
9. From state, parish and special taxes, the homestead, bona
fide, interpreted herein as consisting of a tract of land, or
two or more tracts of land with a residence on one tract and
a field, pasture or garden on the other tract or tracts, not
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, buildings and ap-
purtenances, whether rural or urban, owned and occupied
by every head of a family, or person having a mother or
father, or a person or persons dependent on him or her for
support, (to the value of two thousand dollars) provided
that this exemption shall not extend to any municipal or
city taxes, save and except in Orleans Parish, and shall in
Orleans Parish apply to the State, the general city, the
school, the levee and levee board taxes, and the State Treas-
urer shall be authorized and is directed to reimburse the
general or special funds of the State and any of its political
subdivisions, police juries, boards, commissions or offices
and the City of New Orleans, for any sums which may be
lost to the State, its general or special funds and any of its
political subdivisions, police juries, boards, commissions,
offices and the City of New Orleans, occasioned by reason of
the homestead tax exemption herein provided for, out of
funds which shall be established and provided for by the
Legislature in the Property Tax Relief Fund, said reimburse-
ment to be made pro rata out of said Fund. Provided, that
homesteads shall not be exempt from taxes, state, parish, lo-
cal or special, or from taxes of the City of New Orleans, to an
amount greater than the necessary funds available in the
Property Tax Relief Fund to make the reimbursement herein
7. The more liberal provision in favor of veterans, Art. X, § 4 (9b), is
identically phrased except for the amount of the exemption and the inser-
tion of the date limitation.
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provided, and all provisions of this Constitution and the
laws of this State in conflict with this paragraph are hereby
repealed. The exemption of homesteads shall extend to the
surviving spouse, or minor child or children, of a deceased
owner and to the bona fide homestead when occupied as such
and title thereto is in either husband or wife, provided that
the exemption shall not be extended to more than one home-
stead owned by the husband or wife."
Since the provisions of Act 109 of 1921 (E.S.), Section 3,8
require assessors to value and list all real estate on the assess-
ment rolls whether such property is exempt or non-exempt from
taxation, it is clear that the duty to make an assessment obtains
whether the homestead exemption has application or not. Fur-
thermore, since the exemption is contingent upon the existence
of adequate monies in the Property Tax Relief Fund for reim-
bursement 9-and may, in no event exceed $2000, the need for
assessment is plainly obvious. The assessor's problem, therefore,
is one of determining what property is entitled to the exemption.
Admittedly, the language of the constitutional provision, above
quoted, is fraught with difficult problems of interpretation.
Strangely enough, however, in the fifteen years that the pro-
vision has been a part of Louisiana's organic law, the courts have
not had a single occasion to pass upon the meaning of any of
its terms. This is a surprising circumstance to a lawyer and to
the casual observer may, perhaps, bear mute testimonial to the
wisdom and soundness with which the provision has been admin-
istered by the assessors and other taxing officials. More prob-
ably, however, the explanation for the dearth of indicia of con-
troversy in this area is to be found in political considerations. 10
The parish tax assessor, holding elective office, is a wholly human
individual possessed of no desire to alienate the political affec-
tions of his constituents. In such a setting it is inevitable that
doubts may be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The political
consideration, ever present in ordinary matters of assessment,
is a particularly potent one in homestead exemption diserata
since the parish suffers no loss of revenue by its allowance be-
cause of the .reimbursement provisions of the State Property Tax
8. La. R. S. (1950) § 47:1703.
9. During the first year of administration of the program the exemption
was limited to $1000 because of inadequate funds to reimburse the full
amount of the exemption. In recent years, however, the full $2000 has been
allowed.
10. This is the opinion of the writer based upon conversations with
assessing officials.
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Relief program. Another factor, undoubtedly leading to the
absence of case materials on the issue, is the comparative insig-
nificance of the sum involved (the amount of the tax on two
thousand dollars' worth of valuation), which renders litigation
impracticable as a financial matter. In any event, and regardless
of reasons, it is certain that the mere absence of court decisions
does not mean that the assessors have not encountered problems
in connection with the administration of the exemption. The
attorney general has, on numerous occasions, been asked to
advise assessors-and the tax commission-with reference to a
wide variety of problems arising under the exemption. In the
course of giving his opinions in answer to such inquiries the
attorney general has referred to decisions of the courts inter-
preting and applying the analogously phrased provisions of
Article XI of the State Constitution governing the homestead
exemption for the protection of debtors.
It is difficult to set forth any general rules as to the facts
and circumstances necessary to establish the exemption of a
homestead from taxation. Each case where an exemption of the
homestead from taxation is claimed must be determined by its
own special facts and circumstances. However, a fair distilla-
tion of the conclusions reached by the courts under the home-
stead exemption from claims of creditors, as well as the opinions
of the attorney general under the provision here involved, may
be safely undertaken to illustrate how various particularized
problems have been dealt with.
"Homestead, bona fide"
One of the first terms to be found in the constitutional pro-
vision which suggests need for definition is the phrase "home-
stead, bona fide." As a term of general law the word "homestead"
is usually taken to mean the dwelling house constituting the
family residence, together with the land upon which it is sit-
uated and the appurtenances connected therewith. It has both
a popular and a legal significance, but its popular and legal mean-
ings are the same. In common acceptance of the term it means
the residence of the family, the place where the home is. If the
words "bona fide" used in conjunction with the term "home-
stead" impose any additional requirement, they would seem to
,mean that the person claiming the exemption must be the owner
in good faith of the property claimed as his homestead, and that
such person must actually reside thereon with a continuing in-
tention to make it his homestead. In other words, his residence
1950]
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must be on the property claimed as exempt. As long as a certain
lot or parcel of land contains his home and he makes his resi-
dence thereon, and it does not exceed 160 acres, that is his home-
stead."
Size, Shape and Character of Tracts
The exemption is limited to 160 acres of land and the build-
ings and appurtenances thereon, which includes, under the term
"appurtenances," irrigation canals, pumps and machinery. In
cases involving farms or tracts in excess of 160 acres, the exemp-
tion is apparently to be restricted to the residence and the
adjacent 160 acres, with the result that if this property does not
equal the full $2000 worth of exemption, no further acreage can
be taken into account.12
Prior to the adoption of the 1942 amendment' 3 authorizing
the inclusion of two or more tracts within the homestead, it was
said that the exemption extended only to the land actually owned
and occupied as a residence and not to another physically sepa-
rated tract even though the taxpayer owned it and actually cul-
tivated it.14 The attorney general did rule, however, that the
mere fact that a public road was located in the middle of one
property did not convert it into two separate tracts.1 5
Since the adoption of the 1942 amendment, however, it is
clear that two or more tracts may be included within the exemp-
tion, so long as the sum total acreage does not exceed 160 and
they are devoted to the designated purposes, that is, "with a resi-
dence on one tract and a field, pasture or garden on the other
tract or tracts." 6 It is also clear that the same owner may in-
clude both rural and urban property within the same exemption
as, for example, where he lives in a house in town and actually
devotes rural property fully and completely to the use or uses
required. Similarly, it is possible for a person living in a resi-
dence which he owns in the country to claim both that property
and a city lot if he devotes the city lot to use as a field, pasture
or garden. The attorney general has also alluded to the advisa-
bility of the tax commission's adopting rules or regulations to
prevent exploitation of the exemption in these circumstances by
11. St. Mary Bank and Trust Co. v. Daigle, 128 La. 758, 55 So. 345 (1911).
12. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4086.
13. La. Act 259 of 1942.
14. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4087.
15. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115, 1126.
16. La. Act 259 of 1942.
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a "designing applicant."' 7 He has also stated in this connection
that if there are homes on the two or more tracts, the exemption
will not extend to more than one of them since the others are
not being devoted exclusively and entirely to the required pur-
poses.' In the same opinion he also expressed grave doubt
whether the exemption should be extended to cover separate
tracts where they are located in different parishes except under
extenuating circumstances plainly demonstrating compliance
with all requirements-to be carefully observed by the tax
commission.
A somewhat related question arises where a single tract
lies partly in one parish and partly in another. In an early opin-
ion19 the attorney general stated his opinion to be that there
could be no apportionment in such cases, concluding that the
exemption applied only to the residence and that part of the land
in the parish in which it was situated. In a subsequent opinion
by the same attorney general, however,20 and without referring
to the earlier statement, he reached the other conclusion, saying:
"There is no provision in the law that the entire home-
stead, not exceeding 160 acres, must be located in one parish.
We believe that where a man owns and occupies a tract of
land as a homestead, bona fide, and the assessment is not
more than the amount apportioned for the homestead tax
exemption, and the acreage not more than 160 acres, he
should be allowed the homestead tax exemption, regardless
of the fact that part of the property might lie in one parish
and the balance in another.
"The application for homestead tax exemption would, of
course, be filed with the assessor of the parish wherein the
home is located; then, the taxpayer should furnish the
assessor of the other parish with copy of his application
filed in the first parish, with necessary proof that the prop-
erty is in one block and that same is occupied as a homestead,
bona fide, the amount of the total assessment, and the num-
ber of acres in the whole tract, whereupon the assessor in
the second parish should accept an application for a home-
stead tax exemption, applicable to the property located in
the second parish."
17. Opinions of the Attorney General (1942-1944) 1660, 1661.
18. Id. at 1678.
19. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115, 1128.
20. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1047.
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The latter opinion seems to be the better considered and
should be regarded as controlling if for no other reason than
that it is the latest pronouncement on the subject. In neither of
the opinions is reference made to the language of Act 170 of 1898,
Section 11,21 reading in part as follows: "When a line between
two parishes divides a tract of land, or plantation; each portion
shall be assessed in the parish in which it lies." Since this statute
clearly authorizes the separate assessment, there would seem
to be no logical or practical reason why the exemption should
not be applied to each part on an apportioned basis.
A number of cases have been referred to the attorney gen-
eral involving property upon which the owner maintains his
residence and also conducts his business. In such cases he has
consistently expressed the view that the exemption is applicable
but only to the extent of the value of that portion of the prem-
ises devoted to bona fide homestead purposes.2 2 This, of course,
requires that the assessor undertake the additional burden of
apportioning and assessing the separate portions of an otherwise
integrated property unit. This rule is also said to have applica-
tion to multi-unit dwellings where the owner occupies one of
the units as his residence and rents the remaining unit or units
to others. 23
Owned and Occupied
Although the requirement that the homestead, to be exempt,
must, among other things, be "owned and occupied" by the claim-
ant, would appear to be one easily and quickly susceptible of as-
certainment, numerous perplexing problems have arisen under
it. The language of the exemption seems clearly to require that
the claimant both own the property and occupy it as a residence
in order to qualify for the tax benefit. Mere ownership without
occupancy or occupancy without ownership is insufficient. These
two concepts will be considered separately:
Ownership. One of the more difficult questions in this regard
arises where the claimant has built a house, which he owns, upon
land which he leases from another. In a series of three conflicting
opinions, the office of the attorney general ruled first that "Where
the home itself is owned bona fide by the exemptioner, and he
meets all the other requisites, the exemption extends to such
21. La. R. S. (1950) § 47:1952.
22. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115, 1120, 1130, 1139,
1144.
23. Id. at 1130, 1139.
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home, even though the land upon which it is situated is held
under lease and not in absolute ownership; '24 and next (by the
same attorney general and without making any reference to the
earlier opinion) that "it would seem that it is necessary for a per-
son to own both the house and lot in order to obtain the home-
stead tax exemption;" 25 and, finally a restatement of and specific
reference to the first opinion without mention of the intervening
contradiction.2
6
Here again, it seems advisable to follow the view most re-
cently expressed, not only because it is to be taken to supersede
any previous inconsistent opinions but because it finds support
in the adjudicated court decisions under the analogously worded
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution. In the case of In i6e
Vincent,27 a bankruptcy proceeding, United States District Judge
Dawkins allowed the bankrupt the benefit of the homestead
exemption with respect to a house which he owned situated on
lands which he leased from a school board. It should be pointed
out that Article XI exempts enumerated items of movable prop-
erty in addition to buildings and contains the phrase "whether
these exempt objects be attached to a homestead or not," and the
bankrupt relied upon this latter phrase to secure the exemption
of his house notwithstanding lack of ownership of the land. It
was contended on behalf of the creditors, on the other hand,
that the quoted phrase, because of punctuation in the article,
did not modify the word buildings. Significantly, it is submitted,
Judge Dawkins said:
"Even if it cannot be said that the expression in this
article, 'whether these exempt objects be attached to a home-
stead or not,' in view of the punctuation, includes buildings
and appurtenances, nevertheless, I believe that the policy
of the State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana, justifies a liberal construction in
favor of the homesteader. '2
A somewhat related problem was dealt with by the attorney
general in another opinion 29 which posed the following set of
facts and circumstances:
"The owner of the farm conveys one acre of his eco-
24. Id. at 1126.
25. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1054.
26. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4108.
27. 28 F. (2d) 396 (C.C.A. 5th, 1928).
28. Id. at 397.
29. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4078.
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nomic farm unit to a Local Housing Authority, upon which
acre the local authority will construct a dwelling to house
the operator of the farm unit. The former dwelling which
housed the operator of the farm unit is demolished. The
standard form of deed used for the conveyance of this one
acre of the farm to the local housing authority contains a
covenant, running with the land, that so long as the one
acre is owned by the local authority, the remaining acreage
which is not included within the one acre transferred to
the housing authority, will not be used for any purpose other
than a farm to be operated or worked upon by a tenant or
occupant of the house constructed by the local authority, and
that there will not be constructed on the farm any other
dwelling house. The standard form of deed also gives to
the farmer an option, which may be exercised at any time
within a period of sixty years from the date of completion
of the dwelling unit, to re-purchase the house and acre at the
fair value thereof but not less than the unamortized portion
of the loan incurred by the local authority thereon. The
homestead exemption would be claimed by the farmer only
upon that portion of the farm remaining in his ownership
after transfer of one acre thereof to the local authority. ' '9 0
The problem was, obviously, whether the farmer who was com-
plying with all other requirements necessary to entitle him to
claim the exemption and was enjoying the exemption, lost the
righi to it merely because he had transferred title to one acre
of his farm to a local housing authority for the purpose of con-
structing thereon a new farm house which would remain in the
name of the housing authority until the farmer had paid the
farming authority the cost of constructing the new house. This
issue was resolved in favor of the farmer and the exemption was
granted. The opinion refers, as many of them on this subject do,
to the principle of liberality of construction of the exemption
saying:
"While tax exemptions are, as a general rule, strictly
construed, the purpose of the homestead tax exemption was
to grant relief to small home owners, and in order to accom-
plish this purpose, this Department has, since the enactment
of the homestead exemption statute, construed the law as
liberally as possible, following the rule announced in Lyons
v. Andry, 106 La. p. 360:
30. Id. at 4079.
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"The right of homestead exemption is in this
state a constitutional right, and the terms by which
it is granted should not be narrowed by either the
legislature or the courts.'"
and then concluded that
"Under the facts presented in your letter, it is clearly
evident that the farmer in transferring his one acre of land
to the local housing authority, has no intention whatever
of relinquishing his right to the property for the purposes
of occupancy as a residence in connection with his entire
homestead; on the contrary, the farmer reserves to himself
an option to re-purchase both the one acre and the improve-
ments thereon and binds himself further not to build another
residence on any other part of the property owned by him
but to use the entire property in connection with his farm.
Such a transfer of the property to the housing authority is
in the nature of a sale with the right of redemption. In the
case of Maxwell v. Roach, 106 La. 123, the Supreme Court
held that where it appeared that a conveyance of property
in the form of a sale with a right of redemption for cash
was mainly intended to secure a debt, the owner of the
property was entitled to claim the homestead exemption
granted to debtors whose property was seized."3' 1
On several occasions, however, the attorney general has re-
fused to extend the principle just discussed to cover the situa-
tion in which an individual resides on the property and is in
the process of acquiring ownership thereof through the device
of a "lease and purchase contract. '3 2 In this latter type of case,
admittedly distinguishable from the one previously discussed,
the opinions have relied upon the language of court decisions
arising under the homestead debtor provisions of Article XI. A
married man, who then owned his home and the property upon
which it was situated and enjoyed the homestead exemption,
was advised 33 that the benefit would be lost to him in the event
he were to transfer legal title to his children of a former mar-
riage even though he retained the usufruct of the property for
the remainder of his life. In such a case, it was pointed out, the
property would no longer be "owned" by the claimant.
31. Id. at 4080.
32. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4110, 4115. Opinions of
the Attorney General (1942-1944) 1679. (All three cases involving vendors
which were agencies of the United States Government.)
33. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1055.
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One final, and troublesome, aspect of the "ownership" prob-
lem remains to be considered-and this involves the issue of own-
ership in indivision, that is, where title to a single piece of prop-
erty is shared by two or more persons jointly. In one of his first
comprehensive opinions34 explaining the provisions of the home-
stead tax exemption, the attorney general, relying upon the
uniform and unbroken line of cases forming the jurisprudence
under the homestead debtor provisions of Article XI, announced
that as a general rule the exemption is inapplicable to property
held in indivision. In the same opinion he pointed out that prop-
erty held by a "set of heirs, one of these heirs living on the place"
paying only the amount of rent necessary "to keep up the taxes"
was not entitled to the homestead exemption;3 r5 and the same
answer was given where all the heirs so situated as to title were
living on the property. Another situation also discussed in the
same opinion 3 6 involved land owned by four brothers, one of
whom resided on the premises caring for the dependent mother,
and again the exemption was considered inapplicable; and at the
same time it was also held that an estate of 500 acres, owned in
indivision by eight heirs, four of whom resided thereon with
their families, was not entitled to the exemption.37 In later
opinions it has been stated that property owned by a partner-
ship would be regarded as held in indivision and hence not en-
titled to the exemption38 and that joint owners of a duplex, each
being the head of a family and residing on the premises, were
owners in indivision and thus not entitled to exemption.3 9 The
appropriate remedy for owners in these situations is, of course,
to seek partition of their undivided interests, thus clearing the
way for allowance of the exemption where other requirements
are met.
The general rule forbidding homestead exemption to prop-
erty held in indivision has several important qualifications if it
is community property that is being considered. The first of
these is that the husband, who has the usufruct of community
property, is entitled to claim his homestead exemption on the
community property.4 0 The second important qualification is to
be found in the constitutional provision itself wherein it is stated
34. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115, 1125.
35. Id. at 1127.
36. Id. at 1128.
37. Ibid.
38. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1044.
39. Opinions of the Attorney General (1946-1948) 1045.
40. Marcotte v. Messick, Man. Unrep. Cas. 42 (1880).
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that "The exemption of homesteads shall extend to the surviving
spouse, or minor child or children of a deceased owner." Pur-
suant to this provision the surviving spouse may be entitled to
the exemption although as a literal technical matter title to the
premises may at that time be held in indivision with others.
This aspect of the problem is more fully discussed in a subsequent
portion of this article.
Occupancy. Turning from the concept of ownership to that
of occupancy we find that a large number of inquiries which
have been considered by the attorney general have involved
the principle of "constructive occupancy." These cases involve
claimants who, under ordinary circumstances, would be clearly
entitled to the exemption by reason of ownership and occupancy
of the requisite type of property but who, because of the require-
ments of their employment, are required to leave the homestead
and take up residence at another place for varying periods of
time. Typical of this class of cases was that involving an army
officer who owned property in the City of New Orleans which
had been granted the exemption. Upon being summoned to
active duty he and his wife took up their residence at Camp
Shelby in Mississippi, turning the New 'Orleans property over
to relatives who occupied it rent-free for the purpose of preser-
vation and protection during the homesteader's absence while
in the service. Under these circumstances it was held that the
officer continued to be entitled to the exemption, the New Or-
leans premises being his "domicile" in any event and his absence
therefrom being at the direction of the armed forces and not of
his choosing. This principle, enunciated by the attorney general
in an opinion dated May 31, 1941,'4 1 was later codified by the
legislature's adoption of Act 309 of 1942 which eliminated the
residence requirement for homestead exemption in the case of
all military personnel while in the services "during the present
war and its duration." A similar acquiescence in the construc-
tive satisfaction of the "occupancy" requirement has been in-
dulged in the case of state employees owning homes elsewhere
who had been required to move to Baton Rouge because of their
employment by the state,42 as well as cases involving private
employment. 43 In these cases it is always presumed that the
homestead is available for occupancy by the temporarily absent
claimant-as for use on holidays or vacations-and that the
41. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4088.
42. Id. at 4092.
43. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1054.
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premises are not rented to others. These rulings, while covering
exceptional circumstances, seem to accord with the general law
on the subject in most jurisdictions. In the frequently-cited case
of Lyons v. Andry,44 the Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained
the claim of homestead (under the debtor provisions of the Con-
stitutions of 1879 and 1898) in a case where the claimant's house
had been destroyed by storms in 1893 and where subsequent to
that time (apparently for 6 or 7 years) he had continued to cul-
tivate it, but lived with his son on the latter's leased premises
"about three-quarters of an acre" from the claimant's property.
Throughout this period another son of the claimant, found to be
a dependent, occupied a very small shanty on the homestead
premises.
A more doubtful situation was dealt with in the attorney
general's opinion dated January 24, 1942, 45 where it was said
that state employees moving to Baton Rouge were entitled to the
new homes exemption of Paragraph 11 of Section 4 of Article
X (since repealed) even though they were allowed to retain
voting residence in the parishes from which they came. Although
there is little question of their ownership and occupancy in such
cases, there would seem to be real doubt concerning the bona
fides of their intent to make the premises their actual homestead.
Head of Family or Person Having Dependents
Even though the claimant may "own" and "occupy" the
premises as his "homestead, bona fide," he nevertheless fails to
qualify for the exemption unless, in the language of the con-
stitutional provision, he is a "head of a family, or person having
a mother or father, or a person or persons dependent on him or
her for support." A single exception from this requirement (to be
discussed later) is that expressed in the provision itself in favor
of "the surviving spouse, or minor child or children of a deceased
owner." It is first to be noted46 that the requirement is in the
alternative, that is, the claimant must be either the head of a
family or a person having a mother or father, or a person or per-
sons dependent upon him for support. He need not be both.
Whether there is any real difference between the two classes of
claimants may be the subject of some conjecture-since the term
"head of a family" would in most cases be embraced within the
44. 106 La. 356, 31 So. 38 (1901).
45. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 3879.
46. As observed ir Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115,
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common understanding of the alternative phrase. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, considering the identically worded provision
of Article XI, did point to one situation in which a difference
might obtain, and at the same time laid down some definitive
limits of the term "head of a family" in Whyte v. Grant,47 where
it said:
"Although our opinion has been that the homestead
exemption applied only to the homestead owned by a person
having another person or other persons dependent upon him
or her for support, we cannot imagine what could have been
the purpose of changing the language of the law so as to
include expressly 'every head of a family,' unless it was
thought by the framers of the Constitution that one might
be the head of a family of which no member depended upon
the head for support. And we can well imagine such a case.
For example, the father, or widowed mother, of a family of
minor children possessed of a fortune, would be, in a sense,
the head of the family, even though no one was dependent
upon him or her for support; and his or her homestead might
be held exempt from seizure and sale, under the strict letter
of Article 244 of the Constitution.
"But we do not consider the plaintiff in this case, in any
sense, the head of the family composed of herself and her
major, self-supporting son. Both members of the family may
regard her as the head of the family, but the law does not.
She has neither responsibility nor parental authority over
-the only other member of the family. To hold that she is
the head of that family, merely because, perhaps, she and
her son so regard her, would be putting as strained a con-
struction upon the language of the law as if we should hold
that she is entitled to the homestead exemption because she
is depending upon herself for support; for the law does not
expressly grant the homestead exemption to one having
another person dependent on him or her for support,
although that is surely what it means. The opinion generally
accepted is that, to be the head of a family, one must either
have a responsibility (i. e., at least a natural or moral obli-
gation) to support another person, or have parental authority
over another member of the family.
48
Neither of the terms, "head of a family" or "person having
47. 142 La. 822, 77 So. 643 (1918).
48. Ibid.
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a mother or father, or a person or persons dependent on him or
her for support" embraces a widow or widower who has no de-
pendents, unless it falls within the survivorship clause of the
exemption, nor do they cover a spinster or bachelor who is with-
out dependents for support.49 An opinion to the contrary, holding
a widow entitled to the exemption where she was living in her
own home and who was dependent for support upon her two
daughters, is so clearly contrary to the language of the constitu-
tional provision and the many other opinions on the subject it
should be disregarded. 0 In an opinion dated February 12, 1941,51
the attorney general considered the case of a brother and sister,
both single, each of whom owned property. Although facts
upon which to predicate a definite opinion were not clearly set
forth, the opinion reads in part as follows:
"It would appear from your letter, in which you state your
physical condition, that you might be dependent for support
on your brother, in which case, he could claim the homestead
exemption, because of that fact, on his property if you are
actually living on that property. If you are not living on
that property, of course, he could not claim the exemption,
because such exemption is only in favor of the bona fide
owner of the land, which must be occupied as a homestead
by such person. ' 52
Several of the Attorney General's Opinions have dealt with
the question of the availability of the exemption where the
property is owned by the wife. Normally, of course, the husband,
during marriage, is regarded by the law as the head of the family.
However, in an opinion dated March 13, 1935,' 3 the attorney
general said:
"Where a married woman is the owner of the property
claimed as a homestead, and it appears that the support of
the family actually depends on her, because of some extra-
ordinary infirmity of the husband, she is entitled to the
benefit of the exemption. Baker v. Richardson, Man. Unrep.
Cas. 265. The wife (widow) does not lose her homestead
by marrying an impecunious man, as there may then be
49. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1111, 1125, 1147.
50. Id. at 1130.
51. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4098.
52. Id. at 4099.
53. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1115.
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more necessity than ever for a homestead. Harrelson v.
Webb, 124 La. 1007 (1912).
"'Notwithstanding a married woman is living
with her husband, she may be entitled to claim an
exemption as the head of a family where from neces-
sity she has been compelled to assume the burdens
and responsibilities which belong to such headship.'
25 C. J. p. 26, Sec. 32 e. ' '54
Note the emphasis placed upon the fact of the husband's depen-
dency. In a later opinion, dated March 25, 1935,-5 he said:
"Where a husband and wife with their family are living
on a farm which is the separate property of the wife, and
the husband cultivates said farm for the support of the fam-
ily, it is our opinion that the wife would be entitled to the
homestead exemption. In such an instance, the wife is
compelled to assume burdens and responsibilities which
belong to the head of the family, and she would therefore
be entitled to the exemption.
"However, where the property is urban property and
the husband works in a store for a salary on which he could
reasonably support his family, we do not believe the home-
stead exemption should be allowed on the separate property
of the wife. But, if the salary received by the husband is so
small that a degree of responsibility for the support of the
family would necessarily devolve upon the wife, in that case
the exemption should be allowed. These cases should be
submitted to the Louisiana Tax Commission, and the Com-
mission should determine whether or not the exemption
should be allowed after they have considered all of the facts
in connection with the case."5 6
Note, again, the inferential importance of dependence. And on
April 18, 1935, 57 in answer to a query reading as follows:
"I have a friend whose wife owns one half of her resi-
dence, the other half being owned by her six children. Three
of these children are living in the home with this friend and
54. Id. at 1125.
55. Id. at 1144.
56. Id. at 1145.
57. Id. at 1147.
19501
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
his wife and are dependent upon them. Does this case come
within the Homestead Exemption?"58
he stated:
"We are of the opinion that there is no question but that
one homestead exemption is allowed in this case. It should
be allowed under the wife's assessment." 59
It is to be noted that there was no consideration of actual depen-
dency by the husband upon the wife in the latter case, nor of
the point of ownership in indivision.
Unquestionably, of course, a corporation cannot be regarded
as the head of a family, and consequently land which is owned
by such an organization is not entitled to the exemption even
though it appears that the corporation is a one-man affair created
by an individual who has incorporated all his property-and
who, if such action had not been taken, otherwise meets all the
requirements for exemption. 0
Although the attorney general has had exceedingly few
occasions to consider the proper meaning of the term "depen-
dent" under the exemption, the adjudicated cases which have
arisen under Article XI indicate in broad outline that the term
extends to those persons as to whom the claimant is under a
legal duty to support. Thus it was held in Prudential Insurance
Company v. Guillory,61 that neither foster children, nor an adult
son who was confined in a state hospital for the insane were
dependents of the claimant. Similarly in Askew v. Parker,62 it
was held that the illegitimate child of a son of the claimant, not
being entitled to support as a matter of law, was not a dependent.
Before leaving the topic of head of family and person with
dependents, some consideration must be given to the concluding
sentence of the constitutional provision, to which previous ref-
erence has been made. This provision reads as follows: "The
exemption of homesteads shall extend to the surviving spouse,
or minor child or children, of a deceased owner and to the bona
fide homestead when occupied as such and title thereto is in
either husband or wife, provided that the exempticn shall not
be extended to more than one homestead owned by the husband
or wife." It was previously indicated that this sentence creates
58. Id. at 1148.
59. Id. at 1148.
60. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4103, 4119.
61. 175 La. 1058, 145 So. 6 (1932).
62. 131 La. 753, 60 So. 233 (1912).
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one of the two exceptions to the general rule forbidding the
extension of the exemption to property held in indivision. Thus
the survivor is entitled to the benefits of the exemption notwith-
standing the fact that upon the dissolution of the community
by death, he or she then holds the property in indivision with
the heirs of the deceased.
But what of the normal requirement of dependents? Cer-
tainly the language of the Constitution imposes no requirement
in such circumstances. The attorney general in two opinions has
concluded, on the basis of the jurisprudence of the supreme
court cases arising under Article XI, that where the survivor is
a widower he may claim the exemption only if he has depen-
dents;63 but, that if it is the widow who survives, she gets the
exemption whether she has dependents or not,64 citing the cases
of Baker and Company v. Davis,65 and Succession of White,66 as
supporting these two conclusions, respectively. It is submitted
that there is no proper basis for the distinction thus drawn. In
the first place, and admitting that the jurisprudence under
Article XI relating to the homestead exemption for the protec-
tion of debtors, is, by analogy, applicable in aid of the proper
construction and interpretation of general terms of similar im-
port in the homestead tax exemption provision, there are funda-
mental differences in the very language of the survivorship
clauses of the two provisions which make interpretation by
analogy an exceedingly risky business. In the second place,
fundamental differences in the nature of the purposes or objec-
tives of the two provisions forbid the complete application by
analogy of the jurisprudence under one provision from being
arbitrarily applied to the other. And finally, in the light of
statements to be found in the language of the Supreme Court's
decisions, it is extremely doubtful if, confronted today by the
same issue presented in the Baker case, the court would follow
that decision.
Elaborating, very briefly, upon these points:
First: The survivorship clause of Article XI reads simply: "The
benefit of this exemption may be claimed by the surviving spouse,
or minor child or children of a deceased beneficiary." (Italics
supplied.) Certainly this language is susceptible of the interpre-
63. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4112.
64. Id. at 4101.
65. 143 La. 215, 78 So. 473 (1918).
66. 170 La. 403, 127 So. 883 (1930).
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tation consistently given it by the court, namely, that the sur-
vivor who has no dependents is entitled only to claim exemption
from the very debts against which the decedent himself could
have asserted the bar of the exemption-not newly created or
acquired ones of the claimant alone. The jurisprudence, as will be
demonstrated, goes no further than this. With this in mind, con-
trast the importantly different language of the survivorship
clause of Article X which reads as follows: "The exemption of
homesteads shall extend to the surviving spouse, or minor child
or children, of a deceased owner and to the bona fide homestead
when occupied as such and title thereto is in either husband or
wife, provided that the exemption shall not be extended to more
than one homestead owned by the husband or wife." (Italics
supplied.) This language, it is submitted, clearly contemplates
a continuing extension of the exemption to the homestead even
though the tax obligation thereon will accrue after the decedent's
death and will be incurred by and in the name of the survivor-
the very basis on which the court has refused to extend the
homestead exemption for the protection of the debtor as con-
tained in Article XI.
Second: The second observation (that differences in purpose
justify differences in interpretation) flows naturally from the
first, both upon the basis of the language differences of the two
provisions as well as from the decisions interpreting and apply-
ing the exemption contained in Article XI. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana in the case of Succession of White6 7 discerned the
purpose and resulting consequences of Article XI to be as
follows:
"The whole story of the exemption of the homestead is
that the obligation of the debtor to those whom he owes the
duty to support is a higher obligation than the payment of
his debts. The purpose of the framers of the law was to
secure a home beyond the reach of financial misfortune,
around which gather the affections of the family; the great-
est incentive to virtue, honor, and industry. Herbert v.
Mayer, 48 La. Ann. 938, 20 So. 171. This purpose would cer-
tainly be defeated if we should hold that the exemption in
favor of a husband and father was not transmitted on his
death to his widow and children. We cannot so hold. On
the contrary, our conclusion is that it is only where a widow
seeks to claim the homestead exemption against her own
67. Ibid.
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debts that she must do so as the head of a family or have
a dependent or dependents; that these conditions are not
required when she claims the exemption against debts con-
tracted by her husband or by the marital community-debts
against which the husband, himself, could have successfully
claimed the exemption; that in such a case the exemption
inures to her benefit as the surviving spouse upon the death
of her husband, the original beneficiary under the consti-
tutional article." 68
Clearly the type of obligation against which relief is provided
by Article X on the other hand, is only of one character-
that of tax liability. Quite clearly also the language of the con-
stitutional provision makes it abundantly clear that the exemp-
tion is to be conferred whether the liability was incurred at a
time when the land was owned by the decedent or after it has
passed on to the survivor--"and title thereto is in either hus-
band or wife," as the provision so clearly states.
Third: Insofar as the jurisprudence under Article XI supports
the view expressed by the attorney general, the following may
be said:
(1) It is true that in the case of Baker & Co. v. Davis,6 9 the
survivor, a widower without dependents, was denied the exemp-
tion under Article XI, the court rejecting his claim that the sur-
vivorship clause dispensed with the need for dependents, saying:
"In order to recognize defendant's claim, it would be
necessary to interpret this clause of the Constitution as
meaning that every widow and widower, by the mere fact
of once having been married, would forever be entitled to
the homestead exemption though no one were dependent
upon her or upon him for support. We do not think that the
quoted clause, when construed in connection with the first
paragraph of article 244, conveys any such meaning; on the
contrary, we believe that the surviving spouse must be one
having a mother or father or a person or persons dependent
upon him or her for support, and that its main purpose is
to entitle the surviving spouse, having dependents upon him
or upon her, to claim the benefit of homestead on property
belonging to the community and owned by the survivor in
indivision with the heirs of the deceased."70
68. 170 La. 403, 407, 127 So. 883, 884 (1930).
69. 143 La. 215, 78 So. 473 (1918).
70. Ibid.
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But, as pointed out by the court in its later decision in Succession
of White, "the debt against which the exemption was urged in
that case was the personal debt of the claimant and not the debt
of the marital community."'1
(2) In the Succession of White case the court did allow the
exemption where it was shown that the debt against which it
was asserted was one validly incurred by the marital commun-
ity-against which the husband could have invoked the bar of
the exemption had he lived-and the surviving wife was per-
mitted to do so even though she had no persons dependent upon
her. There is no intimation that the sex of the survivor has any-
thing whatsoever to do with the applicability of the exemption;
rather it is a question of the character of the debt.
(3) In all of the other cases which have involved claims for
exemption by widows and widowers notwithstanding dicta in
the opinions concerning the need for dependents-it will be
found that the exemption was never denied on that ground alone
when a debt of the type involved in Succession of White was
presented.
Forfeiture and Redemption
A number of attorney general's opinions treat the problems
of forfeiture, adjudication to the state and redemption of home-
stead property. Their substance may be briefly summarized as
follows: The exemptioner's failure to pay taxes on property
(movable or immovable) other than his homestead does not
deprive him of the right to claim his exemption provided all
requirements are met.7 2 Homestead property which has an
assessed valuation in excess of the $2000 exemption may be
advertised and sold for the amount of taxes due on the excess
valuation.7 3 It has been suggested, however, that if the home-
steader owns other property than the exempt plot, it should be
advertised for sale first if such non-exempt property will bring
enough to satisfy the amount of taxes due.7 4 It has also been
ruled on several occasions that the homesteader is entitled to
the exemption for the year in which the tax sale or adjudication
to the state occurs provided the sale takes place sufficiently late
in the year to permit action on the application.75
71. 170 La. 403, 407, 127 So. 883, 884 (1930).
72. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1056.
73. Ibid. Opinions of the Attorney General (1938-1940) 1086.
74. Opinions of the Attorney General (1938-1940) 1086.
75. Opinions of the Attorney General (1940-1942) 4105; Opinions of the
Attorney General (1942-1944) 1673.
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Since the homestead exemption is not applicable to drain-
age and levee taxes, there may be an adjudication to these types
of taxing districts in the event these are the only delinquent
taxes involved. Where, however, state and parish taxes are also
included in the delinquency, the property should be adjudicated
to the state.76 In the course of adjudication proceedings, as pre-
viously indicated, the tax collector should apply the amount
received on account of exemption from the treasurer out of the
Property Tax Relief Fund, as an acquittance against the property
and proceed to adjudicate the property to the state for the bal-
ance only.77
Following adjudication to the state and the lapse of one
year it was improper prior to the enactment of Act 111 of 193878
to continue to assess or show a homestead exemption for the
property. 79 With the adoption of that act, however, it has become
the duty of the assessor to continue to assess the property "during
the period allowed by existing law for its redemption"-a period
fixed by Act 72 of 1928 to be "as long as the title thereto is in
the State or in any of its political subdivisions." Hence the state
is regarded as no longer having an absolute title following the
former period of one year allowed for redemption, but an in-
choate one with a right to sell the property at a subsequent sale.
Hence it has been ruled that since the property must continue
to be assessed in the name of the tax debtor, it is proper to allow
the homestead exemption, provided the other requirements are
satisfied, and consequently the taxing district may continue to
participate in the receipt of funds from the Property Tax Relief
Fund during this period.80
On the redemption side of the picture it has been repeatedly
and consistently held that the tax debtor who has met all other
conditions of the exemption is entitled to credit therefor upon
redeeming his property although as a technical matter he has
not actually owned it during the period it has been held by the
state following adjudication."' This, of course, complements the
practice just mentioned, and prevents the taxing districts from
76. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1058.
77. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1059.
78. La. R. S. (1950) § 47:1955.
79. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1059.
80. Opinions of the Attorney General (1942-1944) 1668.
81. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1046, 1061; Opinions
of the Attorney General (1942-1944) 1668, 1675; Opinions of the Attorney
General (1946-1948) 1105.
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collecting twice on the same assessment-once from the Property
Tax Relief Fund and again from the homesteader.
There remain, for rather brief consideration, a few other
aspects of the homestead exemption which, though important,
are not so controversial or difficult as those previously discussed.
The first of these may be designated "the tax day problem."
In one of the early opinions on the subject the attorney general
first ruled8 2 that the exemption granted to an owner who met
all the necessary qualifications on January 1, did not carry over
to the mortgagee who thereafter and during the same year
acquired title to the premises by foreclosure proceedings against
the mortgagor-exemptioner. This opinion was subsequently
reversed 3 in the light of the contrary rule of law which has
been consistently stated in the jurisprudence of the supreme
court. In New Orleans Bank & Trust Company v. City of New
Orleans,8 4 the court succinctly states the rule as follows: "If the
property is exempt on the tax day (January lst), it is not liable
for taxes during that fiscal year, although it afterwards goes into
the hands of those not exempt."8 5
Strict adherence to the principle thus enunciated would, in
a reversed situation, operate to deny the otherwise bona fide
homesteader of the benefit of the exemption if he did not acquire
title to the premises until after January 1, or, owning the prop-
erty, did not occupy the house-or perhaps even complete its
construction for occupancy until after such date. However, the.
attorney general in several opinions8 6 has expressed the view
that the exemption should be granted in such circumstances pro-
vided such acquisition of title or occupancy takes place before
the assessor makes his report to the state treasurer.
Another question, frequently the subject of inquiry to the
attorney general, but not intrinsically difficult, is what taxes
are subject to the homestead exemption. In his opinions in
response to a score or more of such inquiries over the years,
he has consistently advised that the exemption applies to all
taxes, regular or special which are levied by the state, the par-i
ishes or political subdivisions except municipal taxes outside
82. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1143.
83. Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1041.
84. 176 La. 946, 147 So. 42 (1933).
85. 176 La. 946, 958, 147 So. 42, 45 (1933).
86. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1127; Opinions of the
Attorney General (1938-1940) 1145.
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the Parish of Orleans. 7 The exemption does not have applica-
tion to acreage, drainage or levee taxes.18
In New Orleans, alone among the municipalities of the state,
the homestead exemption applies to municipal taxes. The City of
New Orleans is treated as the Parish of Orleans and is on a parity
with all other parishes of the state for the purposes of the exemp-
tion and reimbursement from the Property Tax Relief Fund,
since the city is territorially coextensive with the parish. 9 And
in New Orleans, where municipal taxes are levied on 85% of the
valuation assessed for state purposes, the $2000 homestead exemp-
tion is to be deducted from the full valuation and the tax levied
on 85% of the balance, NOT by deducting 15% from the full val-
uation and subtracting the $2000 exemption from the remainder.90
CONCLUSION
Here, then, in substance, is the law of the homestead tax
exemption in Louisiana. Certainly it must be conceded that the
problems encountered in its administration are as complex-as
litigious-as those involved in the normal grist of cases to be
found on the dockets of the courts. Yet, how is it to be explained
that fifteen years of administration of such a Pandora's Box of
potential law suits has failed to produce a single reported deci-
sion? A partial answer to this question was undertaken in the
opening pages of this article,9' and the theory advanced that triv-
iality of the sum involved, or political considerations may ac-
count for the phenomenon. Reference to the latest available
statistics discloses that the amount of money is in excess of thirty-
two dollars per year for the average taxpayer. 92 Many lawsuits
have been filed involving smaller sums, even where it did not
represent an annual exaction. This renders more plausible the
87. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1111, 1114, 1134, 1138,
1139, 1140; Opinions of the Attorney General (1936-1938) 1042, 1048, 1050, 1052;
Opinions of the Attorney General (1944-1946) 743, 1007; Opinions of the
Attorney General (1946-1948) 1046, 1120.
88. Opinions of the Attorney General (1934-1936) 1137; Opinions of the
Attorney General (1936-1938) 1052, 1058; Opinions of the Attorney General
(1944-1946) 1007; Opinions of the Attorney General (1946-1948) 1046.
89. Opinions of the Attorney General (1942-1944) 1668.
90. Opinions of the Attorney General (1938-1940) 1139.
91. Pages 408 and 409, supra.
92. Thirty-First Annual Report of the Louisiana Tax Commission for
the year 1947. Table No. 70, pp. 98-100 discloses that for the year involved,
297,012 applications were granted, resulting in the exemption of $9,526,284.70
In taxes.
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political considerations to which previous reference was made.
At the outset of this article, the writer foreswore any considera-
tion of the merits of the exemption, but if that issue is to be
re-examined, either in isolation or as part of the larger question
current among fiscal planners-total abandonment of the prop-
erty tax-this might be food for thought.
